Eclipse Bazaar · Eclipse Warranty

Verification — Eclipse Warranty

No on-chain commitment exists for this verdict yet. The scorecard is the published record, and its digest below lets any copy be checked byte-for-byte against the file served here — a same-host check until per-verdict anchoring ships with Phase-1 D2.

What this proves — and what it doesn't. Byte-integrity proves this record is unaltered since publication. It does not by itself prove the tool is safe: safety rests on the test verdict's scope, what was not tested, and the tool's current operational status — the other dimensions shown on this page.

Issued by Verity (Cyan Eclipse Technologies) — a role-separated internal desk of the same company that publishes this catalog. Issuer relationship: first-party. The bench is not an external third-party evaluator.
No signing key is published for bench scorecards: verdicts are unsigned hosted records today. The only published key identity in the chain is the Eclipse Anchor attestation key, at batch level.

Availability

Catalog status: in-development

Distribution: MCP over stdio

Live-state note (from the catalog record): Bench evidence: argus-batch-20261026/bench/warranty/VERDICT.md + REBENCH-1.md (Verity, independent bench over stdio JSON-RPC only, store copies only). This bench issued no test-bench/results scorecard; scorecard_ref is null and no scorecard is claimed or hosted for this product.

Test verdict

Bench verdict: CERTIFIED (local, fixture)

Certified scope: CERTIFIED (local, fixture) — Verity independent bench 2026-10-26, REBENCH-1 of the v0.1.1 D1/D2 fix round (repo @ 6fd6784): 96 probes recorded, 95 asserted PASS, 0 FAIL, 1 observation (O1, design-consistent, no condition attached). D1 attacks PASS 26/26 (supplied-pack injections/relabels/wrong-types → INVALID; store copies → INVALID + transfer refused; get_pack structural refusal 3/3); D2 attacks PASS 24/24 (wrong-type and extra-field arguments rejected cleanly on all five tools, zero coercion, nothing registered by a rejected call); P2 tamper matrix PASS 5/5 bound fields + 11/11 chain + 6/6 supplied-pack attacks; P4 negative space PASS 18/18 (unregistered serial = plain negative, duplicate serial SERIAL_ALREADY_REGISTERED, unknown tools NO_SUCH_TOOL); P1 mechanism spot-check PASS 3/3 (fresh-process verify VALID after transfer, no original holder). Prior verdict on v0.1.0 (VERDICT.md): CONDITIONAL (local, fixture), 67 asserted PASS / 0 hard FAIL, defects D1 (MEDIUM, unsealed-field injection) + D2 (LOW, schemas unenforced) — both closed by this re-bench. The v0.1.0 seal break is verified real and its disclosure judged honest and complete for LOCAL/fixture scope: packs sealed under v0.1.0 verify INVALID under v0.1.1, no migration, fixtures re-registered. Scope = LOCAL/fixture only: caller-supplied fixture purchase refs, stdio transport, HMAC-SHA256 demo seal with a local demo key. The pack is a witness record, not a warranty contract — no adjudication, coverage, eligibility, or enforceability is claimed by the product or tested here. Observation O1 stands on the record: get_pack refusal is structural-only by design (a pure value tamper is still returned by get_pack but gated everywhere it matters — verify INVALID, claim_check transferable:false, transfer refused); consumers must treat verify_pack, not get_pack, as the validity gate (SPEC §5.3). Bench note D3 (informational, by design): transfer requires no holder authorization — possession of pack_id is a bearer capability, exactly as SPEC §3/§5 specify for v0.1; it must be revisited before any hosted/live scope.

Lifecycle status of this verdict record: current

Publication integrity

No scorecard is published for this listing, so no digest exists.

Anchor state: NOT_ANCHORED

No receipt hash is linked to this record in the published records; verdict anchoring ships with Phase-1 D2 of the Eclipse Anchor program.

Network context — the one confirmed anchor batch does not cover this verdict: batch b18e97a2efad… attests sealed Herald receipts (hash-chain seq 1-4) · Base tx 0x6a69e35cbe70428f1fa97251759e2b5fa974bd422f68a076ac5de72c7b2459d4 · block 53163637 · attestation key 1adf4657a0c5684cebf52df1c8eea1b47d7778100b0a78862c7e84c6ddda19b7

A chain commitment, where present, commits to the digest of the record — it proves the record's bytes are unaltered since commitment. It does not commit to, or prove, the tool's behaviour or safety.

Operational status

Trust state: UNVERIFIED · Drift: UNKNOWN

Benched version: — · Latest seen: 0.1.1

Verify recipe

  1. Cross-check the verdict and scope against this product's record in the append-only verdict feed (/verdicts.json) — corrections arrive only as superseding records.
  2. On-chain: not yet available for this verdict — no receipt is linked to it in the published records (per-verdict anchoring arrives with Phase-1 D2). The scorecard and the verdict feed are the complete published record until then.

Downloads: verification.json · verdicts.json · trust-feed.json